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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
A State-Level Carbon Tax With Border Adjustments
by David Gamage and Darien Shanske
Introduction
This is our fourth and final essay considering 
taxation and greenhouse gas mitigation. In our 
prior essays, we began by laying out the policy 
argument for a state-level carbon tax with border 
adjustments. The argument, in brief, is that 
levying a carbon tax makes the products and 
services of the taxing state more expensive, and 
thus border adjustments are needed so that a 
carbon tax achieves more than economic harm to 
the state that levies it.
We also explained the consensus that the 
dormant commerce clause would prevent a state 
from levying a carbon tax with border 
adjustments. Again, the basic reason is 
straightforward: A border adjustment would, by 
definition, be a surcharge on goods and services 
produced out of state. Thus, border adjustments 
would seem to fly in the face of the core rationale 
for the dormant commerce clause, namely 
rejecting state protectionism.
We further distilled the doctrinal issues 
surrounding border adjustments into three 
questions:
• Can there be any special tax on imports,
even if it is the same as a tax on domestic
production?
• Could a state differentiate its border
adjustments between products based on
approximations of their carbon intensity if
such approximations take geography into
account?
• When questions 1 and 2 are answered in the
affirmative, how much approximation is
permissible?
Our most recent article concluded with one 
doctrinal argument that border adjustment could 
be permissible. That argument maintained that a 
carefully crafted system for border adjustment 
ought not fail dormant commerce clause scrutiny 
because such an adjustment would not constitute 
discrimination against out-of-state products and 
services. If the adjustments are keyed only to 
carbon intensity rather than geography, neither 
the imposing state nor other states are inherently 
advantaged or disadvantaged. We noted that the 
Ninth Circuit accepted a similar argument
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In this edition of Academic Perspectives on 
SALT, Gamage and Shanske offer their fourth 
and final article on the issue of taxation and 
greenhouse gas mitigation. The authors defend 
a border adjusted carbon tax against claims it 
would violate the dormant commerce clause by 
asserting the tax does not favor in-state 
industries, but is instead a tax on a global 
externality.
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regarding a California regulation, the Low 
Carbon Fuel Standard, which accounts for carbon 
intensity in roughly the same way.1
In this article, we will lay out three additional 
doctrinal arguments and a background 
consideration, all of which support our 
conclusion that a state-level carbon tax with 
border adjustments could be permissible.
Facial Discrimination May Not Be Fatal 
Because of the Complementary Tax Doctrine
We now explore arguments that do not rely on 
the contention that a taxing scheme attuned to 
carbon intensity is not discriminatory. This is of 
particular interest because the Ninth Circuit was 
split in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey2 — 
a case that accepted an argument similar to that in 
our prior essay.
One argument would be that a border 
adjustment represents a complementary tax and, 
as such, the prima facie discrimination is not 
invalid because it “achiev[es] a legitimate local 
purpose that cannot be achieved through 
nondiscriminatory means.”3 The key modern 
application of the doctrine is Henneford  v. Silas 
Mason Co.,4 in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
upheld Washington’s imposition of a use tax on 
out-of-state purchases to compensate for the sales 
tax it imposed on in-state sales. Thus, if a court 
does not accept the Rocky Mountain argument that 
there is no discrimination, it might accept an 
argument that the discrimination is justified 
based on the complementary tax doctrine. 
Certainly, if the carbon tax were identically 
imposed on imports — that is, taking no account 
of carbon intensity — the case looks pretty strong. 
But what if, as seems important, a state did try to 
take the carbon intensity of imports into account?
A leading recent case on the doctrine, and one 
seemingly similar to our scenario, is Oregon Waste 
Systems.5 In that case, Oregon imposed a $2.25-
per-ton surcharge on waste imported from out of 
state while charging 85 cents per ton for waste 
generated in state.6 Oregon’s statute required that 
the surcharge “be based on the costs to the State of 
Oregon and its political subdivisions of disposing 
of solid waste generated out-of-state which are 
not otherwise paid for.”7 While Oregon had a 
colorable argument that its surcharge was 
compensatory, it failed the demanding three-part 
test needed to justify upholding a discriminatory 
tax. Under that test, a special out-of-state burden 
must be identified; the out-of-state surcharge 
must approximate, but not exceed, the identified 
burden; and the event that triggers the in-state 
and out-of-state tax must be “substantially 
equivalent.”8
The Oregon scheme failed the first and third 
prongs. The only identifiable charge was the 
charge paid by in-state producers, but that was 
only a third as much as charged to out-of-state 
producers. Thus, there was no identifiable 
burden, at least within the limits of the second 
prong’s requirement that the charges not exceed 
the in-state charge. The state countered that the 
identified charge should take into account the 
general taxes that in-state producers paid but that 
out-of-state producers did not. Yet that argument 
ran smack into prong three; the occasion for 
paying a general property tax, for example, was 
not substantially equivalent to that of paying a 
special surcharge on imported waste. Indeed it 
was a kind of Catch-22; the only way to satisfy the 
first prong was to rely on other charges that failed 
the third prong.
Taking a step back, if the Court accepted that 
compensating for general taxes would suffice to 
justify a facially discriminatory surcharge, it 
seems likely that would lead to abuse and 
1Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 
(9th Cir. 2013).
2Id.
3Oregon Waste Systems Inc. v. Department of 
Environmental Quality of State of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93 
(1994).
4Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937) 
(Cardozo, J.).
5Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. 93 (1994). Cf. Jerome 
R. Hellerstein, Walter Hellerstein, and John A. Swain, 
State Taxation 4.14.[3][c] (2016) (arguing that making the 
exception limited makes pragmatic and principled 
sense).
6Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 96.
7Id.
8Id. at 103.
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retaliation, and so Oregon Waste Systems was 
sound.9 It is, however, quite another thing for a 
state to adopt a tax on a broad new tax base, 
namely carbon, and then to try to mitigate its 
impact with border adjustments. That situation is 
much more analogous to Henneford — the case 
that upheld the use tax as a complement to the 
sales tax.
Or, to return to the test, a border adjustment 
would be based on an identified event — the 
production of carbon — and that event is 
substantially identical wherever it happens. With 
prongs one and three covered, that brings us to 
prong two — whether the border adjustment 
calculation is close enough for purposes of the 
dormant commerce clause — and herein, 
perhaps, lies the trouble. Associated Industries of 
Missouri v. Lohman10 is recent precedent that seems 
to stand in the way.
Lohman was about local use taxes. Missouri 
imposed a 1.5 percent average use tax at the state 
level to compensate for the different sales tax rates 
imposed by some 1,000 localities.11 The Court in 
Lohman found that this average use tax violated 
prong two of the complementary tax test — a 
statewide average did not eliminate the 
discrimination happening on all of the 
transactions in which imported goods were 
charged more than local goods.
Lohman suggests that the approximations that 
would be the necessary basis for border 
adjustments under a state-level carbon tax may 
fail. After all, the state would need to use an 
average or other kind of approximation to 
determine the tax.12 And yet the border 
adjustments we propose could be distinguished 
from the average state-level sales tax at issue in 
Lohman. That is not a case in which a statewide 
average is essentially whitewashing local 
discrimination, which was the Court’s concern in 
Lohman.13 Here, the averages are being used to 
calculate what can only be calculated 
approximately; there is no underlying (known) 
fact of the matter.
Formulary Apportionment as Model for 
Approximation
The Court could still interpret Lohman 
broadly. In particular, it might decide that the case 
stands for the very general principle — there can 
be no averaging, only a precisely known amount 
can be compensated for. Or, relatedly, perhaps the 
Court would conclude that thereis an underlying 
fact about carbon intensity that can be discovered 
without a formula. The Court should be 
encouraged not to interpret Lohman by reference 
to its formulary apportionment cases.
The third prong of the Complete Auto test, the 
test for determining whether a tax scheme 
violates the dormant commerce clause, bars 
discrimination.14 That test is very similar, perhaps 
identical, to the test for regulations. That is the 
prong we have essentially been discussing, but 
there is a second Complete Auto  test prong, which 
requires that a tax be fairly apportioned. Of 
course, if a tax is not fairly apportioned, it is likely 
discriminatory, but that prong is not wholly 
duplicative. A typical apportionment formula, on 
its face, applies to all firms in the same way, 
whatever their location, but fair apportionment 
requires that the chosen method of 
apportionment be reasonable. The Court has long 
accepted rough formulas for apportioning the 
value or income of multistate enterprises, such as 
using the relative amount of railroad track within 
a state.15 This is an area in which the Court 
accepted a reality on the ground, namely that 
9See also Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996).
10511 U.S. 641 (1994).
11Id. at 644.
12Cf. Rocky Mountain, at 730 F.3d at 1093 (California 
fuel standard uses averages).
13Lohman, 511 U.S. at 649-650.
14Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 
(1977).
15See, e.g., Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway 
Co. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940); and Norfolk & 
Western Railway Co. v. Missouri State Tax Commission, 390 
U.S. 317, 324 (1968) (“A number of such formulas have 
been sustained by the Court, even though it could not 
be demonstrated that the results they yielded were 
precise evaluations of assets located within the taxing 
State”). Interestingly, Norfolk is the rare case in which 
the Court did find a formula irrational because there 
was a preexisting value against which the Court could 
compare the value arrived at by formula. That is not the 
case for carbon intensity.
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railroads were multistate enterprises the value of 
which could not be precisely located in a given 
state. The analogy with carbon production seems 
evident.
Two key apportionment precedents are 
particularly notable. First, there is Moorman.16 In 
Moorman, a manufacturer based in Illinois 
challenged Iowa’s use of a single-factor sales 
method of apportionment for ascertaining where 
the income of a multistate corporation was earned 
(and therefore taxable). The Illinois manufacturer 
noted that Illinois, like most states at the time, 
used a three-factor method of apportionment. 
That method looked to the relative proportion of 
sales, property, and payroll that a multistate 
corporation earned in a particular state. Iowa 
used only the sales factor. That choice served to 
increase the income apportionable to Iowa of an 
Illinois business with Iowa sales, but to decrease 
the apportionable income of an Iowa business 
exporting to Illinois. Thus, Iowa’s then-solitary 
use of the single sales factor seemed to advantage 
its domestic businesses. Nevertheless, the Court 
upheld Iowa’s use of the single sales factor. At the 
heart of the Court’s reasoning was the observation 
that it was not Iowa’s formula that discriminated 
or was unreasonable; rather, it was the interaction 
of Iowa’s system with the different systems of 
other states. The Court refused to dictate and 
enforce a uniform formula.17 Moorman therefore 
stands for the principle that the Court will not 
pick and choose between formulas even if a 
chosen formula gives the state that adopts it an 
edge (or at least an apparent edge).
The second important precedent is Trinova.18 
In Trinova, the challenge was to Michigan’s use of 
formulary apportionment in connection with its 
value added tax.19 The plaintiffs asserted that 
value added could be more easily geographically 
located than total firm value or income, and thus 
use of a formula was unreasonable. The Court 
held otherwise. Presumably, Michigan could have 
attempted to locate value added more precisely, 
but the state was permitted to use an approximate 
formula given the still significant complexity and 
guesswork involved in locating value added.20
The formulary apportionment line of cases 
thus provides an argument, by analogy, that 
ought to buttress the use of approximate formulas 
for making border adjustments. If Michigan could 
use a formula rather than try to track down value 
added, why can’t states do something similar 
regarding carbon intensity? Or, put another way, 
the plaintiffs in the formulary apportionment 
cases regularly insisted that they knew, via 
separate accounting, where the value or income of 
their firms was located. The Court has repeatedly 
rejected that contention; since locating multistate 
firm value or income is like “slicing a shadow,”21 
the states were not required to accept the shadow 
slices proffered by the plaintiffs. If that is true for 
property value or income or value added, why 
should that not be true for carbon intensity?
Sidebar: Application of the Spirit of the 
Public Utility Exception?
It must be granted that the Court could reject 
the fair apportionment analogy, instead holding 
that what is an acceptable approximation under 
the fair apportionment prong of the Complete Auto 
test is not necessarily acceptable under the anti-
discrimination prong. As for anti-discrimination, 
no approximating is permitted. Yet there are hints 
in the Court’s recent dormant commerce clause 
jurisprudence that it will not reach out to 
invalidate sensible state innovations.
We should remember that the dormant 
commerce clause is federal constitutional 
common law. The current dormant commerce 
clause test for whether a tax passes constitutional 
muster, the four-prong Complete Auto test, was a 
result of a backward look at what the Court had 
16Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 
(1978).
17Id. at 278-279.
18Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 498 
U.S. 358 (1991).
19There was also a challenge to the formula as 
discriminatory, a challenge the Court summarily 
dismissed. Id. at 384-386.
20Trinova Corp., 498 U.S. at 379 (“The same factors 
that prevent determination of the geographic location 
where income is generated, factors such as functional 
integration, centralization of management, and 
economies of scale, make it impossible to determine the 
location of value added with exact precision”).
21Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 
U.S. 159, 192 (1983).
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done in actual cases — all while overturning large 
parts of the doctrine to that point in the name of 
forging a more pragmatic test.22 Since the advent 
of the Complete Auto test in 1977, one prong has 
become largely irrelevant,23 another prong has 
taken on a surprising life of its own,24 and (at least) 
two additional prongs are tucked into one of the 
remaining two prongs.25 Thus, quite reasonably, 
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote (with Justice 
Clarence Thomas concurring), “I look forward to 
the day when Complete Auto will take its rightful 
place . . . among the other useless and discarded 
tools of our negative Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence.”26 Indeed, in a relatively recent 
majority opinion written by Chief Justice John G. 
Roberts Jr., the Court stated that the “dormant 
Commerce Clause is not a roving license for 
federal courts to decide what activities are 
appropriate for state and local government to 
undertake.”27
That strong language comes from the Court’s 
2007 decision in United Haulers.28 In that case, the
Court essentially overturned a recent precedent29 
to allow localities to monopolize the local waste 
processing business. One of us has argued 
elsewhere that the best way to understand that 
decision is that it was accepting of a new 
economic reality.30 The waste management 
industry used to be one in which competition was 
possible. Yet as the environmental impact of waste 
disposal has grown, so too has the expense of 
treating waste properly. Thus, as was apparently 
the case in the two-county region at issue in 
United Haulers, waste management had become a 
natural monopoly. That is, one very expensive 
treatment plant could handle all the waste in the 
region, and adding a second plant would only be 
wasteful. In such a circumstance, the Court 
narrowed earlier precedent to allow governments 
to pursue an economically sensible solution to a 
regional problem, namely the governments were 
permitted to build one expensive plant and then 
force local waste haulers to use it.31
By analogy, the problem of reducing carbon 
emissions is a new one, and one that transcends 
state borders. The science and economics of 
carbon leakage are hard to deny — or at least 
inappropriate for a court to deny. Why should the 
Court reject all the doctrinal arguments made 
thus far only to hamstring state efforts to address 
what the Court has already accepted is a major 
problem?32 That is an apt place to review the 
arguments thus far to see just how many 
“offramps” are available to the Court, at least if 
confronted by a well-designed system of border 
tax adjustments (BTAs). First, following the 
argument of Rocky Mountain, the Court can find 
that there is simply no discrimination. Second, the 
Court could accept that BTAs satisfy the 
22Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 274, 277-278. Cf. Jesse H. 
Choper and Tung Yin, “State Taxation and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause: The Object-Measure Approach,” 
1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 193, 199 (“The central problem with 
Complete Auto is that its four prongs are functionally 
overlapping and redundant in attempting to fulfill the 
bedrock constitutional value served by judicial review 
of state taxation of interstate commerce: 
nondiscrimination against interstate commerce”).
23The fourth prong, so-called fair relation. Complete 
Auto, 453 U.S. at 609.
24This is the first prong, substantial nexus, which was 
held in Quill to require more substantial nexus than that 
required by the due process clause. Quill Corp. v. North 
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
25The Court looks for the internal and external 
consistency of a tax; those requirements are sometimes 
placed under the anti-discrimination prong, sometimes 
the fair apportionment. See, e.g., Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 
467 U.S. 638, 644-45 (1984) (internal consistency 
required under fair apportionment and anti-
discrimination prongs); and Oklahoma Tax Commission v. 
Jefferson Lines Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995) (internal and 
external consistency under fair apportionment prong).
26Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 201 (Scalia, J. concurring).
27United Haulers Association Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer 
Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. 330, 343 
(2007).
28Id. at 330.
29C & A Carbone Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 
383 (1994).
30Darien Shanske, “The Supreme Court and the New 
Old Public Finance: A New Old Defense of the Court’s 
Recent Dormant Commerce Clause Jurisprudence,” 43 
Urb. Law 659, 669 (2011).
31The Court has made similar adjustments to its 
doctrine in other, related, areas of law and, in particular, 
rate regulation in which the Court ultimately decided to 
leave the setting of utility rates to expert regulators (for 
the most part). Id. at 714-716.
32Massachusetts v.Environmental Protection Agency, 549 
U.S. 497 (2007).
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complementary tax doctrine as it stands. Third, 
the Court could accept that BTAs satisfy a slightly 
revised complementary tax doctrine; even if the 
BTAs contain approximations (as they must), they 
are acceptable by analogy with formulary 
apportionment. The Court should be propelled to 
one of those routes by the same sense of its 
institutional role as a federal court that led to the 
United Haulers opinion.
But perhaps the Court will refuse to follow 
these arguments. Or perhaps the uncertainty here 
will, as a pragmatic matter, prevent the 
implementation of a robust carbon tax with BTAs. 
Is there another way to structure a carbon tax to 
achieve the benefits of BTAs?
Alternative Design: Formulary Apportionment as 
a Substitute for Border Adjustments
Up to this point we have been considering 
formulary apportionment as an analogy for a 
border adjustment. Yet the mere fact that those 
adjustments would occur on imports (and 
exports) arguably might be too great a hurdle to 
clear with the Supreme Court. Fortunately, there 
is still one additional possible approach: replace 
border adjustments with formulary 
apportionment.
Here is roughly how that might work. Instead 
of taxing a refinery as it refines oil, the carbon tax 
would tax the refining firm once a year in much 
the same way states currently administer their 
corporate income tax. For example, an oil refiner 
would report how much oil it refined for use in 
the state, but before that number became the basis 
of the carbon tax, the state would apply an 
apportionment formula based on the carbon
intensity of the oil it imported.33 Thus, a firm that 
imports oil would need to pay its carbon tax after 
the amount of oil it imported was adjusted for the 
carbon intensity of its source, among other 
factors. As with current apportionment formulas, 
a taxpayer should be able to challenge the 
formula. Regardless of the statute, formulas can 
be challenged as unconstitutional because they 
are unreasonable. The Uniform Division of 
Income for Tax Purposes Act offers taxpayers the 
possibility of additional relief, even if a formula 
does not fall below the constitutional floor. That 
should be the case with carbon formulary 
apportionment as well.34
Using formulary apportionment to avoid the 
need for border adjustments is not a novel idea. 
That was part of the reform proposal of the 
California Commission on the 21st Century 
Economy (COTCE).35 The heart of the COTCE 
proposal was a state-level VAT called a business 
net receipts tax (BNRT). Yet imposing a broad 
new tax, it was feared, would disadvantage 
California businesses. The commission did not 
believe it could impose border adjustments to 
strip out — or impose — its new tax. The COTCE 
proposal used formulary apportionment (only the 
sales factor) to try to make up for the lack of 
border adjustments. Unfortunately, and as critics 
noted, formulary apportionment cannot replace
33See Carol McAusland and Nouri Najjar, “The 
Carbon-Added Tax: A CAT That Won’t Hunt,” Policy 
Options, Oct. 2010, section 5, for more detailed 
discussion of how such a system might work in terms of 
estimating the cost of carbon embodied in products. See 
also generally, Charles E. McLure Jr., “The Carbon-
Added Tax: A CAT That Won’t Hunt, California Policy 
Options,” Oct. 2010 (“The most efficient way to 
implement a carbon tax is to impose it upstream. It is 
true that an upstream carbon tax would not provide the 
information required to calculate BTAs; it should be 
necessary to calculate BTAs in some other ad hoc 
way. . . . Fortunately, [border adjustments] would be 
needed for trade only in a limited number of carbon-
intensive basic products that are traded heavily with 
countries that do not limit CO2 emissions”).
34UDITPA section 18.
35California Commission on the 21st Century, Final 
Report (2009).
Academic Perspectives on SALT
State Tax Notes, March 13, 2017  917
For more State Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com.
©
 Tax A
nalysts 2017. A
ll rights reserved. Tax A
nalysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
 border adjustments in that context.36 For instance, 
actual exporters would have their BNRT reduced 
by use of the single sales factor because only in-
state sales would be used in the formula, but 
domestic producers who sell to the exporters 
would not see any reductions because all of their 
sales were in-state. That is because the design of 
the BNRT did not allow the tax to be added or 
subtracted on a transaction-by-transaction basis.
That criticism does not hold for a carbon tax, 
at least in the form we are discussing. The carbon 
tax would only be remitted by a handful of large 
upstream producers; thus, there would not be the 
problem of many businesses having the carbon 
tax built into their prices without chance of rebate. 
Further, the deep issue with relying on 
apportionment in the context of a subnational 
VAT is that sales are different from value added. 
For a carbon tax, the formula would be measuring 
carbon intensity, which is the same as the base of 
the tax.37
Conclusion: A Uniform Division of Carbon for 
Tax Purposes Act?
Once one state made substantial progress 
with the base for a carbon tax, other states could 
copy the model and, ideally, coordinate their tax. 
There are some partial models for this. Many 
taxes, such as the sales tax and the corporate 
income tax, began with specific states taking the 
lead. And under federal pressure, the states 
eventually coordinated their corporate income 
taxes — at least somewhat. Also, the sales tax 
represents a major tax base that the states exploit 
and the federal government does not — in 
dramatic contrast to any other federal system we 
are aware of. Thus, the states adopting and 
coordinating a new and significant tax base 
would hardly be unprecedented and would not 
be, we believe, too difficult. Further, as we 
explained at the outset, such actions by the states 
can have significant impact.
We believe the constitutional issues would be 
reduced as other states joined in the use of a 
carbon tax. Suppose that California is the first 
state to adopt a carbon tax. California does not use 
any coal for the production of energy.38 By taking 
carbon intensity into account, some California 
industries are going to be hurt relative to out-of-
state competitors, but on the whole a court might 
see that it is mostly out-of-state suppliers that 
have their output labeled high intensity. As 
explained above, we do not think that should 
render the system unconstitutional, but the 
argument is much easier to see if, say, Illinois, 
were also to impose a carbon tax and do so in a 
coordinated way with California. Illinois does 
produce energy from coal.39 Illinois’s participation 
thus makes matters particularly clear: The carbon 
tax does not, by design or in effect, help in-state 
industries.40 Rather, it is a tax on a global 
externality.
In the end, we recognize the many reasons 
states have to shy away from imposing a carbon 
tax. Our argument is that the inability to impose 
border adjustments in some form should not itself 
be seen as an insuperable obstacle. 
36Charles E. McLure Jr., “The Business Net Receipts 
Tax: A Dog That Will Not Hunt,” 37 Hastings Const. L.Q. 
745, 749-763 (2010); see also generally Kirk J. Stark, 
“Houdini Tax Reform: Can California Escape Its Fiscal 
Straitjacket?” California Policy Options 1 (Nov. 2010).
37One of us delves into some of the complexities of 
using sales as a proxy for income here: Darien Shanske, 
“A New Theory of the State Corporate Income Tax: The 
State Corporate Income Tax as Retail Sales Tax 
Complement,” 66 Tax L.Rev. 305, 344-347 (2013).
38Energy Information Agency, California Energy 
Production Estimates, 2014.
39Energy Information Agency, Illinois Energy 
Production Estimates, 2014.
40It should be noted that according to the Energy 
Information Agency, the carbon intensity of the total 
energy produced in Illinois is actually a bit lower than 
that used in California. (At least one reason is that 
Illinois uses much more nuclear power than California.) 
The intensity of energy produced in New York is lower 
still. Thus, if those numbers were to be the basis of an 
adjustment, California would start out by apportioning 
less carbon intensity to many other states. See Energy 
Information Agency, Carbon Intensity by State (2000-
2014).
